Explaining variability in the investment location choices of MNEs: an exploration of country, industry and firm effects by Simona Rasciute (1251033) & Paul Downward (1256445)
 Explaining variability in the investment location choices of MNEs: An exploration of country, 
industry and firm effects  
 
 
Dr Simona Rasciute  Professor Paul Downward 
School of Business and Economics  School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences 
Loughborough University  Loughborough University 
Leicestershire  Leicestershire 
LE11 3TU  LE11 3TU 
UK  UK 
   
s.rasciute@lboro.ac.uk  p.downward@lboro.ac.uk 
+44 1509 223620  +44 1509 226365 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
Short Running Title: 
Multinational Enterprise Location Choice 
 
 
 
  
  
 
2 
Explaining variability in the investment location choices of MNEs: An exploration of country, 
industry and firm effects 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the variation in foreign direct investment (FDI) location decisions of European 
multinational enterprises (MNEs.) An innovative empirical approach is applied to a new data set which 
contains over 15,000 individual FDI location decisions in 25 European countries over a 17-year period 
and combines country, industry and firm level factors. The empirical results show that the responsiveness 
of FDI location choices to country-level factors is heterogeneous both across sectors and across firms of 
different characteristics as well as unobserved factors. In particular the results show that the importance of 
the market size, good infrastructure and Western business and legal environment increases with investing 
firm’s size, while proximity, as well as cultural and linguistic ties are more important for smaller firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Multinational enterprises face a number of major decisions while undertaking foreign activities. Firstly, 
they have to decide whether to produce at home and export, or whether to produce abroad (Helpman et 
al., 2004). Conditional on locating production abroad the firm then has a second choice among alternative 
locations of production (Rasciute et al., 2014b). Thirdly, the MNE has to choose a mode-of-entry 
(Brouthers, 2002; Boech and Beamish, 2012; Arslan et al., 2015; Hernández and Nieto, 2015). Finally, 
conditional on deciding the entry mode and where to locate, the firm has to decide on the scale of 
investment (Sethi et al., 2003; Kang and Jiang, 2012; Anderson and Sutherland, 2015). The existing 
literature on FDI mainly analyses the first and the last two choices by assessing: why do some firms only 
serve the domestic market, while others also export or serve foreign markets through a subsidiary?; how 
do firms enter these foreign markets and how much do firms invest? There is still a lack of detailed 
analysis of where firms choose to locate their investment. Of the studies that do attempt to investigate 
location choices of MNEs, most rely either on the Multinomial logit (MNL) or the Nested logit (NL) 
model. There are both technical and theoretical reasons why analyses using these models have limitations. 
In the first case, the MNL model, for example, is subject to restrictive assumptions regarding the 
substitution patterns across alternative investment locations1.  In the second case, however, and of most 
importance for this paper, neither of these models allows for unobserved heterogeneity between investing 
firms, which is potentially very important for the choice of investment location as has been emphasized in 
the range of theoretical accounts of behavior in the international business (IB) literature. Sensitivity of 
foreign investors to some country level factors has been investigated across different industries (Jindra, et 
al.  (2016), Carlton (1983), Javorcik (2004) and firm of different characteristics, such as size (Brouthers, 
et al., 1999), however, the exploration of unobserved heterogeneity is of much importance (Basile et al., 
                                                     
1 The NL model only partially relaxes the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption in order to 
allow some substitution across alternative investment locations. 
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2008 and Rasciute et al., 2014a), as many firm characteristics are difficult to measure and quantify, such 
as  the risk preferences of the investing firm's shareholders, the firm's ability to curb opportunistic 
behavior by its local partners (Filatotchev and Wright, 2011; Lien and Filatotchev, 2015), parent's 
ownership structure (Jones and  Butler, 1992), intangible assets like patents, the capacity to innovate, 
superior production technique, and the systems for buying, producing and marketing, etc. These 
unobserved effects may have a further effect on the sensitivity of foreign investors to country-level 
factors and, therefore, need to be taken into account. 
 
As a result, wedraw on Dunning’s OLI paradigm, which then provides a basis for extending the existing 
analyses by explicitly allowing for two layers of unobserved heterogeneity in the investing firms’ location 
decisions. This is undertaken for the first time by using the latent class random parameters (LCRP) model 
(Greene, 2012). This model explores how the effects of country-level factors on investment location 
decisions might vary according to different firm and industry observed characteristics through the class 
membership function, as well as unobserved heterogeneity through its latent class and random parameters 
components. The latent class component allows identifying different groups of investors that may respond 
differently to locational factors, while the random parameters component of the model then controls for 
any heterogeneity that remains within identified classes.  
 
A further innovation of the paper is that we employ a new multi-level data set, combining country-, 
industry- and firm-level data over a 17-year period to examine individual firm FDI location decisions in 
Europe. By applying the LCRP model we seek to investigate how important the investing firm’s and 
investment-receiving industry’s characteristics, as well as unobserved heterogeneity, are in the choice of 
investment location and if alternative locations tend to attract different types of FDI, i.e. is the effect of 
location factors such as market size, transport costs and labour costs, among others, homogeneous across 
different investors like it has been mainly found in the existing empirical literature or does it vary 
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depending on investing firm’s and investment-receiving industry’s characteristics as well as unobserved 
factors?  
 
Our paper is set out as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and research hypotheses. 
Section 3 outlines the methodology. Section 4 presents the results and policy implications. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
 
Although the origins of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm can be traced back to the mid-1950s, the theory has 
evolved and continued gaining relevance in explaining the extent and pattern of international production, 
i.e. production financed by FDI and undertaken by MNEs (Dunning, 2001). The eclectic paradigm states 
that “the extent, geography and industrial composition of foreign production undertaken by MNEs is 
determined by the interaction of three sets of independent variables” that arise from three sub-paradigms 
(Dunning, 2000), based on  ownership advantages (O), location advantages (L) and internalisation (I) 
(Dunning, 1993, 1998, 2001). Initially, the eclectic paradigm concentrated on static and efficiency related 
issues, and the I component was not added until later, when the theory evolved to address dynamic 
competitiveness and location strategy of firms (Dunning, 1998).  
 
Ownership advantages are firm-specific competitive advantages that are created through a firm’s 
international experience, size, its ability to differentiate and adapt its product or service, as well as the 
service and technology intensity (Brouthers et al., 1996). Ownership specific advantages arise from the 
possession of such intangible assets as patents, the capacity to innovate, superior production technique, 
access to raw materials, cheap finance, and the systems for buying, producing and marketing. Ownership 
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advantages have to be unique and sustainable to provide the firm with a competitive advantage (Brouthers 
et al., 1996).  
 
Three main ownership specific advantages have been identified in the literature. The first is the ownership 
advantage arising from monopoly power, identified by Hymer (1976) who analyses MNEs as institutions 
of international production through the perspective of the industrial organisation theory. MNEs would 
emerge as a result of market imperfections by removing competition internationally in order to achieve 
monopolistic power (Dunning and Rugman, 1985). The second is the resource-based perspective, where 
rents arise from scarece and unique firms-specific assets and resources rather than through product market 
positioning (Teece et al., 1997). Most importantly to this paper, it follows from this resource-based 
approach that firms are heterogeneous with respect to their resources, capabilities and endowments (Teece 
et al., 1997). The third ownership advantage is related to ‘dynamic capabilities’, which refer to adapting, 
integrating and reconfiguring internal and external organisational skills, resources and functional 
competencies to adapt to rapidly changing environment (Teece et al., 1997). 
 
Location advantages arise either from natural differences between countries, for example, differences in 
endowments of natural resources, differences in input, production and transport costs, or artificial 
differences, such as trade barriers, taxes and technical specifications, as well as cultural, political and 
legal differences. Location advantages are host market characteristics, such us market risk and potential 
demand. MNEs search for these location advantages to better harness their ownership advantage, 
however, some firms are better than others in harnessing these location advantages.  
 
The internalisation advantage explains why it is more beneficial to exploit ownership and location 
advantages internally by setting up a subsidiary rather than licensing some other firm in the host country 
to produce the good, as firms need to balance the trade-off between the uncertainty of host country risk 
and the economies of scale in their host market expansion.  The internalisation sub-paradigm allows 
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“evaluating alternative ways in which firms may organise the creation and exploitation of their core 
competencies, given the location attraction of different countries or regions” (Dunning, 2000). 
 
The eclectic paradigm goes further arguing that the significance of these three advantages and the 
interaction among them is likely to vary across countries, industries and firms (Dunning, 2001). Diversity 
or heterogeneity of firms and locational environments, as well as firm–location interactions matter 
(Cantwell, 2009). For example, Jindra, et al. (2016) show that home country effects differ for 
manufacturing versus service sectors. Carlton (1983) finds that the unemployment variable, which reflects 
the availability of unskilled labour force, is positive for the industry of Fabricated Plastic Products but it 
is negative for the industries of Communication Transmitting Equipment and Electronic Component. 
Javorcik (2004) finds that weak protection of intellectual property rights deters foreign investors in 
technology-intensive sectors, as it increases the probability of imitation, which erodes a firm's ownership 
advantages and decreases localization advantages of a host country. 
 
Duanmu (2012) finds that Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are differently affected by host 
country’s political risk and exchange rates as compared to non-SOEs. Brouthers et al. (1999) find that 
larger multinational firms tend to use more integrated entry modes in low potential markets than small 
less experienced firms, which tend to use less-involved entry modes, like exporting or licensing, in high 
potential markets. Firms of different sizes and profitability possess different resources and capabilities. 
Small firms are assumed to be characterised by speed, flexibility and niche-filling capabilities due to their 
structural simplicity and faster decision making, entrepreneurial-orientation and less risk aversion (Woo 
1987). As a result, smaller firms respond quicker to the dynamics of the industry environment, they are 
also less likely to be discouraged to invest in riskier environments. Larger firms, in contrast, are able to 
acquire larger market shares by exploiting scale economies, bargaining power, patents, reputation and 
they have more financial resources to deal with shocks and business downturns (Dean et al. 1998). 
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The firm's FDI location decisions are influenced not only by location-specific attributes, the scale and 
skill requirements of different industries,  and/or firm-specific characteristics but also by the risk 
preferences of the investing firm's shareholders and the firm's ability to curb opportunistic behavior by its 
local partners (Filatotchev and Wright, 2011; Lien and Filatotchev, 2015), as well as the parent's 
ownership structure (Jones and  Butler, 1992). The latter factors are difficult to observe and measure, 
reinforcing the important of controlling for not only observed but also unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Therefore, our hypotheses presented in the next section are augmented to incorporate differential firm and 
industry effects of country-level factors, which are then modelled through the class membership function 
of the LCRP model, while unobserved heterogeneity is captured by the latent class and random 
parameters components of the models. The LCRP model is developed in the next section.   
 
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
 
Drawing on Dunning’s OLI paradigm discussed above we now present our research hypotheses on how 
industry and firm level differences, as well as unobserved firm heterogeneity, can influence the 
responsiveness to host country characteristics, when locating capital abroad.  
 
Larger markets are attractive for investors generally, as they provide greater demand for goods and 
services as well as greater supply of inputs. Larger investing firms and firms investing in scale-intensive 
industries, however, benefit from larger markets to a greater extent, as larger markets mean more potential 
to exploit their economies of scale. It is therefore expected that: 
H1a. Larger market size increases the probability of investment location choices and this effect is 
expected to be of most importance for larger investing firms. 
H1b. Larger market size increase the probability of investment location choices and this effect is 
expected to be of most importance for firms investing in scale-intensive industries. 
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Transaction costs of undertaking foreign activities, such as the costs of transport and communication, the 
costs of dealing with cultural differences, the costs of sending personnel abroad and the informational 
costs of institutional and legal factors are found to negatively affect the investment location choices of 
MNEs and these costs are all assumed to increase with distance. While distance is a continuous measure, 
a common border between investing and investment receiving country represents a discrete effect on costs 
of doing business abroad and, therefore, reduces distance (Beugelsdijk and Mudambi, 2013).  
 
These costs are expected to be of more importance to smaller firms who prefer to invest in more 
proximate neighbouring countries with strong cultural and historical ties, while larger firms have bigger 
resources to cover higher transaction costs and they are not (as much) discouraged to locate their 
investment in more remote locations to access larger markets. When distance between a home and a host 
country becomes greater, this increases the uncertainty of doing business, which is especially critical for 
small ventures (Ojala, 2015). Unlike large established corporations, small organizations have limited 
resources for international experience (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994) or for competitive advantages to be 
transformed in such a way as to overcome the difficulties created by distance dimensions (Nebus & Chai, 
2014). These arguments suggest that: 
H2a. Higher transaction costs of undertaking foreign activities decrease the probability of investment 
location choices and this effect is expected to be of most importance for smaller investing firms. 
H2b. A common border between investing and investment receiving country will increase the probability 
of investment location choices and this effect is expected to be of most importance for smaller investing 
firms. 
 
The profitability of the firm investing abroad is expected to be higher if the labour costs are lower in the 
chosen country than in the rest of the destination countries (Barrell and Pain 1999). On the other hand, 
higher wages may reflect higher skills and, therefore, may have a less negative or even positive effect for 
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firms investing in science-based industries, where more skilled labour is employed as compared to other 
industries. This suggests that: 
H3. Higher labour costs in the host country reduces the probability of investment location choices but 
less so for firms investing in science-based industries. 
 
It is not only labour costs, however, but also the availability of labour force that is of importance for 
potential investors. Countries with high local demand for goods and services and high labour market 
flexibility are likely to face relatively low rates of unemployment, which may encourage firms to invest in 
a particular host country. On the other hand, a high unemployment rate may mean that it is easy to recruit 
labour. The impact of the availability of labour on the investment location decision may, therefore, have a 
different effect on firms investing in different industries. It can be concluded that the effect of labour 
force availability is related to skill, therefore, firms investing in traditional sectors employ less skilled 
labour and may be more concerned about the availability of workers, while firms investing in science-
based industries, which employ more skilled labour, may be discouraged by higher unemployment, as 
unemployed people lose their skills through time. These arguments suggest: 
H4. Countries with greater availability of labour force are more likely to be chosen by firms investing in 
traditional sectors. 
 
The institutional, legal and political environment and effectiveness of legal system are important for the 
decision of foreign investors to locate their capital abroad. These factors are of greater importance for 
firms investing in technology-intensive sectors such as science-based industries that rely heavily on 
intellectual property rights (Javorcik, 2004). . Consequently it is proposed that: 
H5. Higher risk in the host country reduces the probability of investment location choices and this effect 
is expected to be of most importance for firms investing in science-based industries. 
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Countries that joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 had to satisfy the economic (market economy), 
political (democracy and human rights) and administrative (well-functioning institutions) criteria set at 
the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. The accession of a CEE country into EU meant free trade 
with EU member states and the adoption of Western business and legal environment, which provided 
foreign investors with confidence in success of each country’s reforms. EU membership created a better 
environment for investors, especially for larger firms, as EU membership increased the size of markets 
into which foreign firms can sell, which enables them to reap economies of scale. Therefore, it is expected 
that: 
H6a. EU membership of investing and investment receiving countries increases the probability of 
investment location choices and this effect is expected to be of most importance for larger investing firms. 
H6b. EU membership of investing and investment receiving countries increases the probability of 
investment location choices and this effect is expected to be of most importance for firms investing in 
scale-intensive industries.  
 
 
The hypotheses above refer to observed heterogeneity, i.e. the sensitivity of country-level factors to 
observed firm and industry characteristics, however, not all sources of heterogeneity may be initially 
directly observable and, therefore, hypothesised. The LCRP model allows taking into account unobserved 
heterogeneity through its latent class and random parameters components, which is discussed in the 
following section. Initially, the latent classes may not be well-defined and the number of classes and their 
characterisation is not known until an “exploratory” data analysis. Unobserved heterogeneity is revealed 
by further sensitivity of country-level factors across different latent classes and further variation in the 
parameters of some country level factors within each class.  
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample and Data 
Our dataset contains variables at country, industry and firm level and the data are drawn for different 
sources. The firm and industry-level data, including the decision where to locate investment, come from 
the Bureau van Dijk Zephyr dataset. Country-level data have been obtained from IMF International 
Financial Statistics and Eurostat. Our sample consists of 15,795 firm-level data observations on 
brownfield FDI location choices by firms of EU15 countries (except for Luxembourg) to firms in other 
EU15 countries and 11 new EU member states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia but not Malta and Cyprus) from 1997 to 2013. Only 
some of the firms (12%) have invested more than once over the period and for most of the firms the 
investment location decision is a one-shot event.  
 
In our sample, EU15 member states have received the largest share of the number of foreign capital 
allocations by MNEs (about 86 percent) with the UK receiving the largest share of the FDI allocations 
(about 14 percent) out of all the EU15 countries,  followed by Germany with about 13 percent of foreign 
capital allocations. Among the new EU member states, Poland has received the largest share of FDI 
allocations (23 percent), followed by the Czech Republic with 15 percent of foreign investment location 
choices.   
 
Service sectors seem to have received the largest number of foreign capital allocation in both regions (61 
percent in EU15 and 60 percent in the new EU member states). Science-based industries, on the other 
hand, have received the smallest share of FDI (approximately 6 percent in EU15 and 4 percent in the new 
EU member states) in the sample.  
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3.2. Variable and Measures 
Our dependent variable takes the value of ‘1’ if the country has been chosen as an investment location and 
‘0’ otherwise. Our explanatory variables presented in Table 1, are based on the hypotheses noted above, 
and are measured as follows: the market size (Hypothesis 1a and b) is measured as the real GDP of the 
host country. The transaction costs of undertaking foreign activities (Hypothesis 2a) are proxied by the 
distance between the capital cities of the investing and the investment receiving countries. It is obtained 
from www.indo.com and is calculated ‘as the crow flies’.  A dummy variable is constructed to take the 
value of 1 if investing and investment receiving countries share a common border and zero otherwise 
(Hypothesis 2b). 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Availability of the labour force (Hypothesis 4) is measured by the unemployment rate which is calculated 
as a percentage by dividing the number of unemployed individuals by all individuals currently in the labor 
force. Labour costs (Hypothesis 3) are included as a measure of the average variable costs of firms and 
they are proxied by hourly wages in manufacturing in Euros but adjusted for the purchasing power 
standard.  
 
Risk of locating capital abroad (Hypothesis 5) is captured by the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index (TICP), which is used as a measure of the extent of corrupt practices in the host country. 
It ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials 
and politicians and it varies from 1 (high corruption) to 10 (no corruption). A dummy variable for EU 
membership (Hypothesis 6a and 6b) has been constructed to take the value of 1 if both investing and 
investment receiving countries were both EU members at the time of investment and 0 otherwise.   
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Tax systems are extremely complex and the statutory corporate income tax rate does not capture the total 
tax burden. As a result, the effective corporate income tax rate  is calculated by dividing taxes on the 
income or profits of corporations including holding gains by the respective host country’s GDP. Our 
approach allows comparisons of different national tax systems, taking into account such important aspects 
as untaxed reserves, tax enforcement and the treatment of losses. 
 
As it is expected that firms investing in different industries and firms of different characteristics respond 
to country-level factors to a different degree, the industries that have received foreign capital have been 
divided into four groups to best reflect the scale and skill intensity: scale-intensive sectors, science-based 
industries, traditional sectors and service sectors. Table 2 provides a detailed breakdown of the specific 
industries in each group. Scale-intensive sectors are typically oligopolistic, large firm industries with high 
capital intensity, extensive economies of scale and learning, high technical and managerial complexity. 
Science-based sectors, on the other hand, are characterised by innovative activities directly linked to high 
R&D expenditures (Midelfart-Knarvik et al. 2000). Traditional (supplier-dominated) sectors include such 
industries as textiles, clothing, furniture, leather and shoes, ceramics, and the simplest metal products. 
Finally, banking insurance and retail are examples of service sector industries.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Finally, the investing firm’s size is measured by the number of its employees, while profitability by its 
earnings before tax. Table 3 summarises all the variables used in the analysis. This includes the country-
level variables, as well as investment-receiving industry dummies and investing firm characteristics. 
Descriptive statistics for these variables include means, standard deviations, as well as minimum and 
maximum values. The means for the dummy variables give the sample proportions of the category 
measured as ‘1’ but the standard deviations don’t have much explanatory power. 
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Insert Table 3 here 
 
3.3. Analysis 
The LCRP model is a form of multinomial model that combines the latent class model with the random 
parameters model in order to accommodate two layers of unobserved heterogeneity. The latent class 
aspect of the model implicitly divides investing firms into a number of classes, Q, while the random 
parameters aspect of the model specifies a continuous distribution of model parameters within each class 
(Greene, 2012). Following Greene (2012), the latent class structure can be specified as the following: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏(𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑞𝑞) = 𝑔𝑔(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝛽𝛽𝑞𝑞)                            (1)  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑞𝑞) = 𝜋𝜋𝑞𝑞(𝜃𝜃),   𝑞𝑞 = 1, … ,𝑄𝑄.                              (2)  
Equation 2 indicates the probability that an investing firm is a member of a particular class based on its 
characteristics such as size, profitability, and the scale and skill intensity of the investment receiving 
industry as well as unobserved firm and industry characteristics, which are difficult to measure, such as 
intangible assets like patents, the capacity to innovate, superior production technique, and the systems for 
buying, producing and marketing. While the observed heterogeneity component is modelled by including 
firm and industry characteristics into the class membership function, following the hypothesis outlined in 
Section 2.2, the unobserved component of the the latent classes, initially, may not be well-defined and the 
actual number of latent classes and their characterisation may not be known until an “exploratory” data 
analysis, where each latent class reveals further sensitivity to country-level factors in addition to the 
sensitivity to observed firm and industry characteristic and further groupings of firms emerge. The 
difference in sensitivity to country-level factors in different latent classes is then due to firm and industry 
characteristics included into the class membership function as well as unobserved heterogeneity. Each 
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class thus represents a certain type of investor who benefits from host country factors to different degrees. 
Equation 1 then describes the choice of country by the investing firm conditional on the membership of 
the class.  This latter behaviour is a function of host country characteristics 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖.  
 
The LCRP model then accommodates further unobserved heterogeneity within classes, as there may be 
further variation in the sensitivity to some country level factors within each class, by allowing for the 
continuous variation of the parameters within classes. In the random parameter aspect of the model, the 
within-class heterogeneity can be derived as the following:  
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖|𝑞𝑞 = 𝛽𝛽𝑞𝑞 + 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖|𝑞𝑞                                                         (3)   
𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖|𝑞𝑞~ 𝐸𝐸 �𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖|𝑞𝑞�𝑋𝑋� = 0,   𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 �𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖|𝑞𝑞�𝑋𝑋� = ∑𝑞𝑞                         (4)  
where parameters in a class ‘q’ vary randomly according to  𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖|𝑞𝑞  which is uncorrelated with all of the 
exogenous data in the sample.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
For robustness reasons, our analysis initially reports the association of country-level variables with the 
FDI location choices of MNEs from estimating a Conditional Logit (CL) model. This provides an initial 
check on the relevance of the data to the location decision. The results are presented in Table 4, column 2. 
The direction and the statistical significance of these host country characteristics are in line with the 
existing literature. Market size has a positive and statistically significant association with the probability 
of firms locating foreign capital. Transport costs, on the other hand, are negatively related to the FDI 
location choices of MNEs, while common border has a positive effect. The labour costs have a 
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statistically significant and negative effect on the probability of locating capital abroad. Unemployment in 
the host country is positively associated with investment location choices of MNEs indicating that foreign 
firms look for a pool of workers when they locate their capital abroad. Interestingly, the tax variable is 
positively associated with the decision of where MNEs locate their investment, which indicates that 
higher taxes may serve as a signal for investing firms of better services and infrastructure in the host 
country. The extent of corrupt practices among politicians and public officials in the host country is 
negatively associated with investment location decisions of MNEs. 2 Finally, the EU dummy has a 
positive effect on the probability of locating capital abroad.  
 
As indicated earlier, however, these results are likely to hide heterogeneous behaviour, as firms of 
different characteristics and firms investing in different sectors may be affected by country-level factors 
to a different extent. As a result, to capture the observed heterogeneity, a CL mode with interaction terms 
between country-level variables and firm and industry characteristics are estimated (Table 4, Column 3). 
The significance and signs of the separate country-level variable parameters are the same as in the 
previous CL model, however, in addition a number of interaction terms appear to be statistically 
significant. The statistically significant interaction terms between host country market size and the size of 
the investing firm as well as the dummy for scale-intensive industry indicate that larger investing firms 
and firms investing in scale-intensive industries benefit from larger markets to a greater extent as 
compared to smaller firms and firms investing in traditional sectors, science-based sectors and service 
sectors, as larger markets mean more potential to exploit their economies of scale. Statistically significant 
interaction terms between investing frim size and transaction costs as well as the dummy for common 
border between investing and investment receiving country indicate that smaller firms tend to invest in 
more proximate neighbouring countries with strong cultural and historical ties, while larger firms have 
                                                     
2 Although the sign of the estimated parameter of the Risk variables is positive, the relationship between the 
investment locations decisions and the extent of corrupt practices within the host country is negative, as the variable 
is coded in the way that it varies from 1 (high corruption) to 10 (no corruption). 
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bigger resources to cover higher transaction costs. Statistically significant interaction term between the 
unemployment rate in the host country and the dummy variable for traditional sectors indicates that 
industries that employ more unskilled labour prefer countries with higher unemployment rates, which 
indicate a larger pool of unskilled workers, as unemployed people may lose their skills through time. 
Finally, statistically significant interaction term between the risk in the host country and the dummy for 
science-based industries indicate that firms investing in technology-intensive sectors prefer more stable 
environment and better intellectual property right protection. 
 
Finally, to also capture unobserved heterogeneity, the LCRP model is estimated and the results are 
presented in Table 4, Columns 4. The fit of the model, indicated by the Log-Likelihood function and 
Pseudo R-squared is considerably better for the LCRP model as compared to both the CL models 
implying the superiority of the LCRP model. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
The results in the ‘Class Membership’ part of Table 3 show that the latent class aspect of the model 
divides investing firms into three classes3, where their membership is shown not only to be determined by 
unobserved heterogeneity but also by investing firms’ size, the scale  intensity of the investment-receiving 
industry as well as a dummy for traditional sectors4. Around 31 percent of the firms are allocated into 
Class 1, 34 percent into Class 2 and 35 percent into Class 3. These estimated class membership 
parameters show that Class 1 is more likely to contain small firms, which are more likely to invest in non-
traditional sectors, while Class 2 is more likely to include large firms locating their investment in scale-
                                                     
3 The choice of three latent classes is supported by formal tests, i.e. AIC and BIC criteria, as well as, the rule of 
thumb, where with more than three classes the standard errors of the estimated coefficients become large and the 
class membership probability for at least one class becomes relatively small. 
4 The rest of the investing firm and investment-receiving industry characteristics do not seem to be statistically 
significant. 
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intensive but non-traditional industries. In Class 3 the parameters of investing firm-specific variables are 
normalised as their values are set to zero and the class serves as a base class relative to Classes 1 and 2 
and is thus more likely to contain medium-size MNEs that locate their investment in non-scale-intensive 
industries, which are traditional sectors.   
 
The estimated parameters (random and non-random) for all the variables in each latent class (Table 4, 
upper half of Column 4) show how investment location decisions of MNEs are affected by various 
country-level factors. The standard deviations of the random parameters for unemployment and tax 
variables then capture further heterogeneous behaviour within each class, which is not displayed for the 
rest of the variables as their standard deviations are not statistically significant. These results reveal that 
the three groups of heterogeneous investing firms benefit from country-level factors differently.  
 
The magnitudes of the estimated parameter are, however, not comparable across the latent classes due to 
scale differences. As investing firms in all the three latent classes are positively affected by the host 
country market size, the importance of the effects for this variable across the classes can only be implied 
from the t-statistics in Table 3, which are the highest in Class 2, indicating that market size is of most 
importance for investing firms in Class 2. Class 2 contains larger investors who are more likely to invest 
in scale-intensive non-traditional industries and hence they may locate their capital abroad to access 
foreign markets in order to exploit their economies of scale, showing support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
These firms, however, are not discouraged from locating their investment in more remote (not necessarily 
neighbouring) countries to access these markets (the transport cost variable is positively associated with 
the FDI location decisions of MNEs and common border dummy is not statistically significant in Class 
2). Distance, on the other hand, is negatively associated and common border is positively associated with 
the investment location decisions of MNEs in Classes 1 and 3, which contain small and medium-size 
MNEs respectively (Table 4), showing further support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Small firms are, 
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therefore, more likely to locate their investment in more proximate neighbouring countries with strong 
cultural and historical ties. 
 
We also find support for Hypothesis 3, as wages appear to be statistically significant for investors in all 
the three classes. The variable has a positive effect for investors in Class 1 but a negative effect for 
investors in Class 2 and 3. Class 2 and 3 are more likely to contain investors locating their capital in 
scale-intensive industries and traditional sectors, respectively, which tend to employ less-skilled labour as 
compared to other industries, such as science-based sectors. On the other hand, wages appear to have 
statistically significant and positive effect for firms in Class 1, which contains smaller investors who 
locate their capital in non-traditional sectors, possibly science-based industries. Higher wages do not only 
indicate higher cost and, consequently, lower potential profits for investing firms, but also higher 
productivity, which may counterbalance the former negative effect and be of more importance for firms 
investing in science-based industries. 
 
We do not find support for Hypothesis 4, as the unemployment rate is significant to the investors in 
Classes 1 and 2 and it is positively related to the FDI location decisions,  as investing firms in these two 
classes look for a larger pool of workers.  
 
Higher risk in the host country reduces the probability of investment location choices for small firms 
investing in non-traditional sectors, possibly science-based industries (supporting Hypothesis 5). The 
institutional, legal and political environment and effectiveness of legal system are especially important for 
foreign investors to locate their capital in technology-intensive sectors. We also find support for 
Hypotheses 6a and 6b, as the results show that large firms investing in scale-intensive industries (Class 2) 
are more likely to locate their investment in countries that are EU members. EU membership implies the 
adoption of a Western business and legal environment and free trade, which in turn increased the size of 
markets into which foreign firms can sell, allowing them to reap economies of scale.  
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Firms in all the three classes are positively affected by the tax variable. This might be explained by the 
fact that larger tax income is translated into better services and infrastructure in the host country.  
 
In summary, the importance of the market size becomes more important for larger investors, who locate 
their capital in scale-intensive industries, while proximity as well as cultural and historical ties appear to 
be more important for smaller firms. 
 
Finally, while the latent class part of the model estimates the parameters for each class, capturing the 
mean effect of the variables on the decision to locate foreign investment, the random parameters aspect of 
the main model, also includes the standard deviation for the unemployment and tax variables, and 
controls for an additional layer of heterogeneity within each class.5 The statistically significant standard 
deviations noted are for the unemployment and tax variables and they indicate that there is potential 
further within-class heterogeneity for the two variables and their effects cannot just be captured by the 
mean value of the parameter. As such they control for further unobserved heterogeneity. This offers 
interesting policy implications, as by restricting the mean of the triangular distribution for the two 
variables to be equal to its standard deviation reveals that the sign of the estimated random parameters of 
the two variables is the same for all the investing firms. Consequently, although there is further within-
                                                     
5There are no rules that help in the choice of the appropriate distribution to estimate the random parameters within 
each class apart from the requirement that the mean and standard deviation of the random parameter be statistically 
significant. As a result, the analysis starts by treating each coefficient of the country-level variables separately as 
random by imposing various distributions, which gives an indication of which distribution should be used for 
random parameters when they are combined in the final specification. The statistically significant standard 
deviations noted are for the restricted triangular distribution for the unemployment and tax variables.  
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class variation for some country-level factors, the direction of the two effects is the same for all the firms 
in the same latent class. 
 
Overall our results show that using the LCRP model allows much more flexibility and gives better model 
fit than the CL model, as it accounts for two layers of investing firms’ heterogeneity. This is important 
because, for example, while the distance variable is negative and statistically significant for the CL 
model, which is also broadly found in the literature, the LCRP model shows that the transport costs may 
be positive and negative depending on observed and unobserved investing firm heterogeneity. 
Consequently, country-level factors do not affect investment locations choices of MNEs in a uniform 
way, as firms of different observed and unobserved characterises and firms investing in different sectors 
respond to country-level factors differently. This is a result that has not been established in the literature 
before. 
5. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the international business literature in several ways. First, it applies the Latent 
Class Random Parameters (LCRP) model to investigate the investment location choices of MNEs in 
Europe.  Secondly, it makes use of a novel multi-level data set – allowing firm, industry (or sector) and 
country effects to simultaneously determine the firm-level FDI location decisions. The significant 
empirical results support the presence of observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the investment 
location decisions, which is revealed by statistically significant class-specific parameters as well as 
standard deviations of some of the parameters. The model reveals three classes of foreign investors 
depending on investment receiving industry and country factors, investing firms’ individual 
characteristics and latent heterogeneity that varies with factors that are unobserved.  The estimation 
results overall show that the importance of the market size increases with investing firm’s size and scale, 
while proximity, as well as cultural and linguistic ties are more important for smaller firms.  
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Governments in different countries compete to attract foreign direct investment, as some multinational 
corporations often bring new technologies, management skills and marketing know-how. In order to 
create an investment friendly environment, it is important to understand the factors that influence 
different types of investors as well as their variable sensitivity to the determinants of FDI locations 
decisions. 
Table 1: List of variables, definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Choice 
An EU country in which a firm from EU15 chooses to 
locate its investment over the period of time from 
1997 to 2013 (it gets the value of 1 if the country 
received investment and 0 otherwise) 
Bureau van Dijk Zephyr database 
Msize Real GDP of the host country of the year investment took place 
IMF (International Financial 
Statistics) 
Unempl unemployment rate of the host country  (percentage per annum) of the year investment took place 
IMF (International Financial 
Statistics) 
Dist distance in kilometres between the capital cities of the host and the home countries www.indo.com 
Border 1 if investing and investment receiving countries share a common border and 0 otherwise.   
Wage Hourly wages in manufacturing in Euros but adjusted for the purchasing power standard Eurostat 
Risk varies from 1 (high corruption) to 10 (no corruption) Transparency International  
EU 
1 if both investing and investment receiving countries 
are EU members at the time of investment and 0 
otherwise 
  
Tax 
The ratio between taxes on the income or profits of 
corporations including holding gains and the 
respective host country’s GDP of the year investment 
took place 
IMF (International Financial 
Statistics) 
Science 1 if investment-receiving industry is science-based industry, and 0 otherwise Bureau van Dijk Zephyr database 
Scale 1 if investment-receiving industry is scale-intensive industry, and 0 otherwise Bureau van Dijk Zephyr database 
Tradit 1 if investment-receiving industry is traditional industry, and 0 otherwise Bureau van Dijk Zephyr database 
Services 1 if investment-receiving industry is service sector, and 0 otherwise Bureau van Dijk Zephyr database 
FSize Number of employees in the investing firm of the year investment took place Bureau van Dijk Zephyr database 
Profit Investing firm's earnings before tax in real terms of the year investment took place Bureau van Dijk Zephyr database 
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Table 2: The Allocation of Industries into Groups 
Industry group Industries 
Scale-intensive 
Mining (coal, diamonds and gemstones, general mining, gold 
mining, platinum and precious metals) 
Oil and gas producers; oil equipment, services and distribution 
Forestry and paper 
Chemicals (commodity chemicals and specialty chemicals) 
Industrial metals (aluminum, nonferrous metals and steel) 
Industrial engineering (commercial vehicles and trucks; industrial 
machinery); automobiles and parts 
Utilities (Electricity; gas, water and multiutilities) 
Traditional (supplier-
dominated) 
Food and beverages (brewers; distillers and vintners; soft drinks; 
farming and fishing; food products); tobacco 
Personal goods (clothing and accessories; footwear; personal 
products) 
Household goods (durable household goods; nondurable 
household products; furnishings) 
Containers and packaging; diversified industries 
Construction and materials (building materials and fixtures; heavy 
construction) 
Services 
Media (broadcasting and entertainment; media agencies; 
publishing) 
Retail ( Food and drug retailers; general retailers) 
Travel and leisure (airlines; gambling; hotels; recreational 
services; restaurants and bars; travel and tourism) 
Industrial transportation (Delivery services; marine transportation; 
railroads; transportation services; trucking) 
Financials (banks; insurance); financial services (real estates; 
general financials; investment instruments) 
Science-based 
Electronic and electrical equipment (electrical components and 
equipment; electronic equipment); leisure goods ( consumer 
electronics; recreational products and personal products); 
telecommunications (telecommunications; fixed line 
telecommunications; mobile telecommunications); technology 
(software and computer services; technology hardware and 
equipment) 
Healthcare (healthcare equipment and services; pharmaceuticals 
and biotechnology)   
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Rsik 6.164992 2.047854 2.6 10 
Tax  2.718717 0.81645 0.5 5.9 
EU 0.800165 0.399877 0 1 
Border 0.113783 0.317548 0 1 
Dist 1233.567 651.3158 0 3362 
Wage 16.38624 9.07906 2.269559 39.30735 
Unemp 9.116232 4.023072 3.1 27.5 
Fsize 22516.03 68532.33 0 629135 
Scale 0.182526 0.386278 0 1 
Tradit 0.150934 0.357985 0 1 
Service 0.606711 0.488481 0 1 
Science 0.059829 0.23717 0 1 
GDP 438.6438 635.0613 6.7733 2482.43 
 
Table 4: The Estimated Coefficients of the CL and RPLC Models 
 
Conditional Logit model Latent Class Random Parameters model 
          Random parameters 
Unempl .03027*** 10.41 .02452*** 7.83 .04775*** 6.22 .02670*** 4.34 -0.00559 -0.79 
Tax .17917*** 11.78 .17552*** 11.51 .07803** 2.07 .16571*** 4.29 .11387*** 3.97 
 
  
 
    Nonrandom parameters 
Dist -.00051*** -32.5 -.00055*** -33.5 -.00064*** -12.18 .00050*** 6.34 -.00119*** -16.37 
MSize .00080*** 67.84 .00076*** 58.19 .00043*** 10.39 .00183*** 19.17 .00038*** 6.68 
Wage -.02045*** -18.84 -.02076*** -19.06 .01507*** 3.18 -.04866*** -11.65 -.03505*** -10.59 
Border .91201*** 46.28 .95646*** 45.75 1.48961*** 21.08 -0.11154 -0.98 1.02292*** 16.61 
Risk     .09353*** 14.85 .08885*** 13.8 .34563*** 9.35 -.07174*** -2.61 -0.01685 -0.7 
EU .58853*** 13.68 .59454*** 13.79 11.7217 0.05 2.53972*** 6.31 -0.16683 -1.43 
Msize*Scale   
 
.21588D-06*** 8.84   
     MSize*FSize   
 
0.0** 1.99   
     Dist*Fsize   
 
0.0*** 9.17   
     Border*Fsize   
 
-.17632D-05*** -5.41   
     Unemp*Tradit   
 
.03507*** 5.46   
     Risk*Science   
 
.08500*** 4.08   
     
 
  
 
    Std deviations or limits of random parameters 
TsUempl   
 
    .04775*** 6.22 .02670*** 4.34 0.00559 0.79 
TsTax   
 
    .07803** 2.07 .16571*** 4.29 .11387*** 3.97 
 
  
 
    Class membership 
Constant   
 
    .36879** 2.1 -0.17365 -1.12 Fixed parameters 
FSize   
 
    -.43685D-04*** -5.78 .12726D-05*** 2.7 Fixed parameters 
Tradit   
 
    -.82148*** -5.05 -.23569** -2.36 Fixed parameters 
Scale   
 
    0.04604 0.31 .82302*** 8.3 Fixed parameters 
Class probs         0.312 0.341 0.347 
 Log-likelihood -42875.87746 -42730.57509 -42325.57938 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.0265 0.0298 0.1675099 
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